We explore why venture capital funds limit the amount of capital they raise and do not reinvest the proceeds. This structure is puzzling because it leads to a succession of several funds financing each new venture, which multiplies the wellknown agency problems. We argue that an inside investor cannot provide a hard budget constraint while a less informed outsider can. Therefore, the venture capitalist delegates the continuation decision to the outsider by ex ante restricting the amount of capital he has under management. The soft budget constraint problem becomes the more important the higher the entrepreneur's private benefits are and the higher the probability of failure of a project is.
INTRODUCTION
Why do venture capitalists commit themselves contractually not to raise additional capital for a particular fund? This commitment forces entrepreneurs to seek financing from multiple investors thereby multiplying agency problems. In this paper, we argue that there is an advantage in bringing in illinformed new investors because a well-informed investor may ex post have an incentive not to liquidate an unsuccessful venture although ex ante he would like to commit to do so. By raising only a limited amount of capital in the form of a venture capital fund, the investor can effectively delegate the continuation decision to new investors, who, due to their lack of inside information, will terminate all unsuccessful projects.
A large literature has analyzed different aspects of the organization of venture capital funds: compensation schemes (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a) , the use of covenants (Gompers and Lerner, 1996; Hellmann, 1998) , staged financing (Gompers, 1995; Neher, 1999) and convertible securities (Berglöf, 1994; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; Schmidt, 2003) ; however, the way venture capital funds restrict their access to capital after an initial amount has been raised has attracted scant attention in the literature. The amount of equity that is raised is limited and cannot be increased later; moreover, venture capital contracts do not allow the fund to reinvest profits or issue debt (see Gompers and Lerner, 1999b, pp. 38-39) . These restrictions enforce the venture capital cycle, during which capital is first raised, then invested and, after some time, returned to the investors together with some interest. 1 After capital has been raised, most of it is invested immediately in several firms so that the venture capital fund is unlikely to have enough capital to finance all needs of its portfolio firms until an IPO or tradesale. This gives rise to syndication; i.e. co-financing of later rounds by new venture capitalists. 2 This practice is puzzling given that the relationship between the different venture capitalists should suffer from similar asymmetric information problems as the relationship between investors and entrepreneurs. These problems are known to be severe. What is the advantage of limiting the capital available to venture capitalists if this limitation leads to a multiplication of contracting problems that could be avoided by giving more capital to the intermediary in the first place?
The answer we give in this paper is that the lack of capital of the original investor forces the entrepreneur to find new investors. The fact that these investors are less informed than the original investor is shown to be advantageous because it provides a hard budget constraint for the entrepreneur that increases her ex ante incentives to exert effort. In the following, we will briefly outline the intuition for our main result.
Consider a wealth constrained entrepreneur who obtains capital from an investor to realize a project of unknown quality. The investor is only interested in monetary returns while the entrepreneur derives a private benefit from running the firm. The entrepreneur's effort is necessary for the success of the project but it cannot be contracted on. We consider an investment process that proceeds in several financing rounds, each lasting one period. In every period in which capital and effort are supplied, the resulting realization of profits is a signal about project quality. Whenever the entrepreneur shirks, both types of projects deliver a low profit and nothing can be learned.
If the investor observes the effort choice, an incentive to shirk may arise for the entrepreneur. Every time a low profit realization occurs, although the entrepreneur has worked hard, the investor understands that the project is more likely to be of bad quality and, at some point, he will not refinance the venture. If, however, he observes that the entrepreneur has shirked in a particular period, the investor continues to hold last period's belief, and it is always optimal for him to refinance the project. To understand the tradeoff the entrepreneur faces when deciding whether to supply effort or not, consider a history of the game such that the project's net present value (NPV) will turn negative after one more bad signal. In this situation, shirking induces the investor to finance the project for at least one more period, and secures the entrepreneur at least two periods of private benefits. The expected surplus from a possible success, however, is delayed for one period. If the expected surplus is small, the former effect dominates and the entrepreneur shirks; hence, the investor does not want to finance the project in the first place although it would be efficient.
If the investor lacks the funds to refinance the project and delegates the refinancing decision to a new investor, the entrepreneur's incentive to shirk disappears. The new investor, unaware of last period's effort choice, conditions his refinancing decision only on the outcome and not on the effort decision. The impact of this restriction again emerges most clearly for a history of the game such that the project's NPV will turn negative after one more bad signal. At this stage, the entrepreneur anticipates that the new investor's termination decision after this period is independent of her effort choice, and she chooses her effort to maximize the probability of success; i.e. she works hard.
If the entrepreneur's incentive to shirk disappears, there must be a unique equilibrium in which the investor terminates failed projects. In this equilibrium, the investor holds the correct belief that the entrepreneur has worked hard, and interprets failure as a bad signal; therefore, he shuts down the project after one more failure. Because the incentive to work depends only on the restriction that the termination decision is independent of the effort choice and not on the decision itself, it is impossible to support a different equilibrium belief and, for that matter, a different investment decision on behalf of the entrepreneur.
The soft budget constraint problem dates back at least to Kornai (1979) . 3 Schmidt (1996) discusses in the context of public enterprises how less information hardens the budget constraint. Crémer (1995) considers a twice-repeated hidden action problem with an agent of initially unknown productivity. Because of the repeated interaction, the principal can improve on the optimal one-period contract if he fires the agent after a low profit realization. This decision is ex post inefficient in case of a high-productivity agent, but the principal can commit to firing the agent by forgoing information about his productivity; hence, like in our model, not acquiring costless information may be profitable, but the set-up differs in a number of ways. In particular, the monitoring technology is more powerful, it lets the principal directly know the type of the agent, whereas in our model 3. See Maskin (1999) for an overview over the literature on hard and soft budget constraints. he can only learn the effort choice. As a consequence, forgoing the information is more costly and results in an inefficiency on the equilibrium path while in our model the first best can be implemented.
In Bergemann and Hege (2005) , the entrepreneur can divert funds to private consumption, which reduces the success probability of a project. The incentive to divert increases in a dynamic setting because a project that fails today can be retried tomorrow. If the investor cannot observe the diversion due to arm's-length finance, he interprets the resulting failure as a signal of bad quality and will offer worse financing terms in future periods. This reduces the incentive to divert.
Note that Bergemann and Hege (2005) study a standard moral hazard problem that is unrelated to learning about project quality. In contrast, the agency problem in our paper does not result from an instantaneous gain ( private consumption) for the shirking agent but is dynamic in nature and crucially depends on learning. The agent shirks because she wants to prevent the investor from finding out that the project is of bad quality, which ends financing and the associated private benefits. If there was no learning, the investor would continue to finance the project until success, and the incentive to shirk would disappear; hence, the contribution of our paper is that we describe a new agency problem that matters if learning and private benefits are important, like in venture capital finance. The remedy we prescribe, however, is essentially the same as Bergemann and Hege (2005) .
Closely related to this paper is Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , who show that investors may profit from being able to commit not to refinance projects. They argue that there is a coordination problem and two types of equilibria: one in which all investors pool their endowments and form a few large banks, and another one in which the investors remain small. They use this result to explain the coexistence of different financial systems in different countries such as the Anglo-Saxon and the German-Japanese ones.
In contrast, our model focuses on the role of venture capitalists with restricted access to capital within a financial system; for example, the Anglo-Saxon one. In particular, we characterize the kind of projects that are most likely to suffer from the soft budget constraint problem, and have to be financed by investors with restricted access to capital. Inderst et al. (2007) give another reason, why it may be optimal for venture capital funds to limit the amount of capital they raise. Contrary to our model, effort is costly in their set-up and the distribution of the project quality is determined endogenously. Modeling explicitly a portfolio of two projects, they show that a limited amount of capital enforces that only one project is refinanced even if both projects have a positive NPV. Because only the higher quality project of the two is refinanced, the marginal payoff to a costly investment in quality may increase. This efficiency gain may outweigh the efficiency loss from not refinancing positive NPV projects. In contrast to our model, inefficient punishment of the entrepreneur occurs on the equilibrium path.
G. Gebhardt
r 2008 The Author
74
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3 intermediaries with restricted and unrestricted access to capital are compared. Section 4 discusses some assumptions and possible extensions of the model. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
THE MODEL
In this section, we consider a model of the investment and learning process that leads either to a new business or to the abandonment of the project. We use this model to study the contracting problems that arise if a wealthconstrained entrepreneur needs to obtain funding from an investor.
The new venture requires two inputs: capital and entrepreneurial effort. Capital K must be provided by an investor because the entrepreneur does not have any wealth. It is either supplied or not, which reflects the lumpy nature of investments in the early phase of a firm (e.g. laboratories or clinical trials). Effort must be supplied by the entrepreneur; it is assumed to be costless, which allows us to focus on the soft budget constraint problem. For simplicity, the entrepreneur has a binary choice whether to supply effort or not. Effort in our model could be interpreted as the need for the founders 'to drop their pet projects' to ensure the success of the principal product. Many start-ups are founded by engineers or scientists, who derive a private benefit from breakthroughs in research even if these are not commercially viable; hence, they often dislike spending time on tasks like marketing and investor relations, and prefer to develop the product that is most interesting to them but not necessarily best to be marketed to customers.
Both agents are risk neutral and discount future payoffs with the same discount factor d. The project generates monetary and non-monetary private benefits. In every period in which there is investment, the entrepreneur receives a non-transferable private benefit b, boK. This captures the fact that founders are not only motivated by monetary incentives but also look for independence and have a missionary zeal for their innovation. If the project is successful, the game ends, and there is a verifiable monetary payoff of R and a private benefit equal in value to an infinite stream of the per period private benefit of b; i.e. db=ð1 À dÞ.
The uncertainty involved in the implementation of a new business idea is captured by the assumption that there are good and bad projects, and both the entrepreneur and the investor know only the prior probability l 0 of the project being good. The two types of projects differ with respect to the probability of success. Each period in which both inputs are supplied results in a signal about quality, and uncertainty is resolved over time in a learningby-doing process. More precisely, in each period in which both inputs are supplied the probability of success is g40 for the good project and zero for the bad project. If one of the inputs is missing, the probability of success is zero independent of the type. This assumption is stronger than necessary and imposed for simplicity. For the results to go through, it suffices that effort increases the probability of success.
Depending on the play in a particular period, one of three outcomes regarding the learning process can occur: if one of the inputs has not been supplied, nothing can be learned from a bad realization at the end of the period. In the following, we will call this event 'no signal'. If there has been investment and effort there is either success (also called a 'good signal'), and the game ends, or failure (a 'bad signal').
To formally describe the resolution of uncertainty, we introduce the following notation: let l t denote the belief by the players 4 that the project is good at the beginning of period t. The possible values that l t can take on are contained in a sequence indexed by superscript k: fl k g 1 0 , where l k is the belief that the project is good after both inputs have been supplied k times without success. l k evolves according to Bayes' rule:
hence, for any k, l k can be written as a function of l 0 :
If at the beginning of period t the belief was l t 5 l k and there is no signal in period t because one of the inputs was missing, then l t þ 1 5 l t 5 l k . If there was a bad signal, l tþ1 5 l kþ1 . The first best is to invest and exert effort as long as the project has a positive NPV including the private benefits; 5 i.e. as long as
But the first best cannot be achieved as the wealth-constrained entrepreneur is unable to reimburse the investor for the private benefits. Therefore ignoring 4. For the moment, we restrict ourselves to the case of symmetric information so that the beliefs are identical for all players. Later, we will have to consider differing beliefs. 5. Note that the dynamic optimal stopping point collapses into a static condition because there is no option value of experimentation in our set-up. The belief l cannot increase over time; once l has dropped below l * , investment is inefficient and remains so in any later period. In this case, the continuation payoff from the efficient continuation strategy (no investment in any future period) is zero. If l equals l * , the value of the project at that point is l * gR À K 5 0, and the project should be pursued one last time. Rearranging yields the optimal stopping point.
the private benefit, we define the second best as investment and effort as long as
In the following, we will consider the second best as the benchmark. We can then implicitly definek as the efficient number of trials by
The game consists of N ¼k þ 1 periods. 6 This finite horizon set-up is chosen not only for convenience. We are considering investments into new business models and technologies. In almost all these cases, competitors are working on the same ideas or ideas that could serve as a substitute so that there is a limited window of opportunity for the venture. This aspect is better captured in a finite horizon model; however, the results do not depend on this assumption. In Section 4 we informally discuss an infinite horizon version, in which we get qualitatively identical results. Each period begins with the entrepreneur making a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a financing contract, which is subsequently either accepted or rejected. If it is rejected, a null contract (no investment, no payments) is assumed to be the default option. Then investment takes place, followed by the effort choice of the entrepreneur. At the end of the period the profit is realized. The following figure depicts the exact timing of one period of the game: The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Let us specify the contracting environment in order to derive the set of all admissible financing contracts that may be offered by the entrepreneur. First of all, investment is observable by both parties and contractible. A contract offered in period t may, therefore, specify an obligation for the investor to provide capital in period t. 7 In addition, revenues R are contractible so that a contract can lay down a sharing rule, where E t is the payment to the entrepreneur if there is success in period t. 8 I t denotes the respective payment to the investor; i.e. I t 5 R À E t . The effort choice in any period t is observed only by the entrepreneur and the investor who supplies capital in that period; 6. Any other finite horizon with N >k periods leads to the same qualitative results. 7. Allowing for contracts specifying random investments does not change the results while complicating the exposition. 8. That does not necessarily mean that the occurrence of success is contractible. One should think of the sharing rule as shares of equity held by the investor and the entrepreneur, respectively. outsiders, for example courts or future investors, cannot observe the effort choice, which, therefore, is not contractible. We consider two possible structures for venture capitalists: unrestricted and restricted access to capital. A venture capitalist with unrestricted access to capital can finance any number of investment rounds. A venture capitalist with restricted access to capital has just enough capital to finance one round of investment; hence, the entrepreneur must find other venture capital funds to ensure continued financing of the venture. In a nutshell, restricted access to capital delegates the continuation decision to a new venture capitalist. 9 Note that the new venture capitalist has not observed any of the effort choices in the preceding periods.
While each venture capitalist observes the effort choice in one period, the chain of venture capitalists created by the restricted access to capital behaves exactly like an investor who cannot observe the effort choice. Each venture capitalist in the chain of investors is unaware of the entrepreneur's previous effort choice when he makes the investment decision. Of course, he knows the effort choice after his investment has taken place, but the capital constraint prevents him from using this information in a later financing round. A clean but cumbersome way of modeling the investors would be to make the unrestricted investor a long-lived player, who observes all the effort choices, and to model the restricted investors as a series of short-term players, each of whom has observed only one effort choice and does not take part after having done so. We can, however, get the same results much easier in terms of notation if we model the series of venture capitalists as a single player who participates in every period but has not observed previous period's effort choice. This is the modeling approach we choose.
RESTRICTED VS. UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO CAPITAL
We can now use the model to investigate the advantages of restricting the access to capital for an investor who finances innovative projects.
We first look at the unrestricted investor; i.e. an investor who has observed past effort choices. We can calculate the equilibrium by backward induction. Suppose the game has arrived in the ultimate period (N ), and at least one more trial would be efficient (k <k). Then in the unique continuation equilibrium, the entrepreneur proposes a share I N ¼ K=gl N to the investor, who accepts it. Then the entrepreneur exerts effort. High effort is optimal for the entrepreneur because otherwise she would forgo a positive probability to get her share in the monetary return [and the private benefit db=ð1 À dÞ]. The share makes the investor just break even given the entrepreneur's effort choice, and is the lowest share accepted by the investor. A similar argument 9. In Section 4, we will relax the assumption that a venture capital fund has just enough capital to fund a firm only once.
can be made for any period in which the number of additional trials that would be efficient is larger than the number of remaining periods. In these cases, the continuation equilibria implement the efficient investment and effort choices, and the entrepreneur gets the whole continuation surplus.
Suppose the game has arrived in the penultimate period (N À 1), and only one further trial is efficient (l NÀ1 ¼ lk). Now it is no longer sure that the efficient investment and effort decisions take place. To see why, assume the entrepreneur has proposed I NÀ1 ¼ K=gl NÀ1 , and the investor has accepted. If the entrepreneur now does exert effort, the game ends for sure either because the project is successful or because l N <l and it is no longer efficient to try out the new business. If she does not exert effort, the game moves into the last period and the efficient choice is implemented.
In the latter case, the expected payoff to the entrepreneur is
while in the former it is
Subtracting the equations from each other, we get the following condition that must hold so that it is optimal for the entrepreneur to exert effort given the above contract:
The advantage of shirking is that the entrepreneur can enjoy an additional period of the private benefit in case the project ultimately fails; the cost is that the potential monetary payoff is delayed by one period. Note that the entrepreneur always gets the period t private benefit, which accrues to her as soon as the investor puts up the capital. If the private benefit is large or the expected surplus is low, delaying the project is profitable for the entrepreneur; anticipating this behavior, the investor does not want to finance the project in the first place. In the following lemma, we analyze the same tradeoff as above more generally for all periods t with beliefs l t ¼ l k ðkrkÞ:
Lemma 1. Consider the case of unrestricted access to capital: suppose the project has not yet been delayed in period t, and the belief is l t ¼ l k ðkrkÞ, 
Proof. See Appendix A.
It can be shown that (4) holds for any belief l k ðkrkÞ if it holds for lk; i.e. if (3) holds. Intuitively, a higher belief l decreases the probability of failure and delays its occurrence and, therefore, decreases the value of an additional b in this case; in addition, it means that there are more efficient trials left, which increases the NPV that is delayed and, therefore, the cost of shirking. It remains to characterize equilibrium play if (3) is violated. Because there arek þ 1 periods, the project cannot be delayed more than once; however, if (3) is violated, it must be delayed at least once. Thus we know that, in equilibrium, there will be investment and effort in N À 1 periods and neither investment nor effort in one period.
The exact timing of the delay can be determined by working backwards. Suppose (3) is violated, and in period N À 2 there are still two efficient trials to go; i.e. there has not been delay so far. Independent of the equilibrium play in period N À 2, the ultimate trial will take place in the last period. Either the penultimate trial is delayed to period N À 1, in this case the ultimate trial can only take place in period N, or the penultimate trial is not delayed, then we are back in the situation we analyzed above; because (3) is violated, the last trial will be delayed to period N.
Then the decision problem for the entrepreneur, whether to exert effort or not given that investment has taken place, looks exactly like it did in the case of the ultimate trial only that the belief now is lk À1 . The entrepreneur will exert effort given a contract that gives her the whole surplus if ð1 À glk À1 Þdbrð1 À dÞ glk À1 R À K h i ð5Þ
In this case, the investor will accept the financing contract. If (5) is violated, he will not do so in the first place, and the project stops for one period, and is completed in the last two periods. Equilibrium play, if (3) is violated, can then be found by the following algorithm: if (5) holds, the project will be delayed exactly in period N À 1. If it does not hold, we have to work backwards to find the first period in which l t is large enough so that the project will not be delayed; i.e. ð1 À gl t Þdbrð1 À dÞ gl t R À K ½ ð 6Þ
If we can find one, the delay happens in period t þ 1, if we cannot, it happens in period one. Note that the less often the project has been undertaken, the larger is l t and the larger is the cost of delay and the smaller is the gain; hence, for the first trials the incentive not to exert effort may disappear. 10 Note that, so far, we have not proved that (6) ensures that the entrepreneur will always have an incentive to work hard in periods before t. We leave this to the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A. Proposition 1 summarizes the main results: Let us contrast this result with financing by a venture capitalist who does not have enough funds to finance a second round of investment and who therefore has to find another venture capital fund to provide capital in subsequent periods. This new investor has not observed the effort choices of the entrepreneur so far and will base his decision only on the publicly available information; i.e. how often there has been investment and whether the project has been successful so far or not. Let us again work backwards from the last period; the entrepreneur never has an incentive to shirk in the last period because delay is impossible; hence, there is always a financing contract that a new venture capitalist accepts as long as the new venture capitalist holds a belief larger thanl. Note that this belief cannot depend on the actual effort choices of the entrepreneur in earlier periods but only on expected equilibrium play.
The entrepreneur anticipates this when deciding whether to supply effort or not in the penultimate period. She understands that failed projects are either always or never refinanced in the last period. If failed projects are never refinanced, any kind of failure -due to lack of effort or not -is punished with termination; thus, she will always exert effort because this increases the probability of success. If her project is always refinanced in the last period, failure is never punished with termination, and the incentive not to exert effort disappears, too.
Hence, it is a dominant strategy for the entrepreneur to exert effort in the penultimate period if her offer has been accepted by a venture capitalist. Anticipating this, a new venture capitalist will be willing to supply capital in exchange for a share in R that makes him just break even in expectation. The same argument holds for all previous periods so that the equilibrium beliefs of 10. Allowing more periods can lead to multiple and longer spells of delay; however, the condition for no delay remains the same. the entering venture capitalists must be that the entrepreneur has always exerted effort if capital has been invested. From that follows that there will be venture capitalists willing to supply capital for exactlyk periods so that the second best is always implemented. The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
Proposition 2. With restricted access to capital, there is never a delay in equilibrium.
Of course, this result depends trivially on the assumption that there are at leastk periods. It is, however, independent of the number of periods after periodk. The assumption ofk þ 1 periods is made for convenience only. All potential investors believe that the entrepreneur has always provided effort and conclude afterk failures that the project is not worthwhile. Consequently, they will not invest in the project in any future period. This commitment works even in an infinite horizon set-up.
Limiting the access to capital and delegating the continuation decision to a new investor allows the venture capitalist to have a close (monitoring) relationship with the venture while, at the same time, creating an artificial arm's-length relationship that protects him from the soft budget constraint. We do not observe the same restriction on the access to capital in banks, which may be protected by a true arm's-length relationship, a relationship that, however, does not allow them to invest in projects that critically depend on close monitoring as new ventures do.
Consider two projects with the same expected NPV but different probabilities of failure. Intuitively, the one with the higher probability of failure should suffer more from the soft budget constraint problem because the incentive to shirk stems from the benefit of another round of investment in the case of failure. On expectation, this benefit goes up if the probability of failure increases.
To formalize this intuition, we introduce a sequence of projects that have the same initial probability l 0 to be of good quality and the same NPV conditional on being good V 5 gR. They differ, however, with respect to their g and R. More precisely, we start with a project with some g and R and, therefore, a certain V. Along the sequence, we decrease g and adjust R according to R ¼ V=g; i.e. we increase R so that V stays constant.
Considering condition (5), we can calculate for each project in the sequence a threshold valuel so that there is a delay if the belief drops below that value.l is implicitly defined by
The largerl, the more a project suffers from the soft budget constraint problem. Increasing risk by decreasing g while holding V constant, increases G. Gebhardt r 2008 The Author 82 l , which confirms our intuition that riskier projects suffer more from the soft budget constraint problem.
Proposition 3 sums up this comparative statics result.
Proposition 3. Consider a sequence of projects indexed by subscript p with the same l 0 p ¼ l 0 and V p ¼ g p R p ¼ V but decreasing (increasing) values of g p (R p ). Then the threshold value for the beliefl p ðg p Þ below which there is a delay is falling in g p .
EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Infinite horizon
The qualitative results do not depend on the finite horizon set-up. In an infinite horizon model, one can show that, with or without restricted access to capital, there is a unique Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium (MPBE) with properties similar to the finite horizon case. Here we just give an informal argument.
Consider a game in which each period is identical to the game with an investor with restricted access to capital, but where there are an infinite number of periods. Note that in this game all payoff-relevant information is summarized by the belief l t , which we call the state of the game. In an MPBE, strategies can only be conditioned on the payoff-relevant components of the history; hence, whenever the game is in a certain state, the ensuing equilibrium play has to be the same. As in the finite horizon game, we are interested in the condition that has to hold so that the first best is achieved in the case with restricted access to capital.
Suppose equilibrium play is efficient; i.e. there is investment and effort whenever the game is in a state l t Zlk, and there is neither in every state l t < lk þ1 . For this to be an equilibrium, it is a necessary condition that it is optimal for the entrepreneur to exert effort when the state l t ¼ lk, and the contract in place prescribes investment in exchange for I t ¼ K=glk.
In this situation, if the entrepreneur exerts effort, there is either success or the game moves on to state lk þ1 with no future investment. This results in an expected payoff of b þ glk½R þ db=ð1 À dÞ À K to the entrepreneur. By deviating to no effort, the entrepreneur makes success in t impossible and keeps the game in state lk so that efficient investment and effort is implemented in period t þ 1. The expected payoff then is b þ d½b þ glkðR þ db=ð1 À dÞÞ À K. Comparing the two expected payoffs results in exactly the same condition (3) as in the finite horizon game. If it is fulfilled, exerting effort is optimal, and the second best is indeed an equilibrium. By the same arguments as in the finite horizon game, we can show that if there is no delay atl, there is none for higher l's so that inequality (3) is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for the second best to be reached. Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 If this condition is violated, however, the game drops into an inefficient mixed strategy continuation equilibrium with random delay. The entrepreneur offers I 5 R to the investor and exerts effort with a low enough probability that the investor is just indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer. If the entrepreneur has not exerted effort, the investor refinances with a low enough probability to make the entrepreneur just indifferent between effort and no effort.
In the case of restricted access to capital, it can be shown by the same arguments as in the finite horizon game that the second best is the unique MPBE for all parameters.
Probabilistic refinancing
Another assumption was that a venture capitalist with restricted access to capital can never refinance a portfolio company. Again this assumption is not necessary for the result. To see this, we introduce a probability r that the venture capitalist has some capital left into equation (7). In this case, it reads as follows:
If r 5 1, we are back in the case with unrestricted access to capital. If r is reduced, however, the threshold value of b increases and it goes to infinity as the probability to have some capital left goes to zero; hence, as long as r is less than 1, there is a gain from hardening the budget constraint through the venture capital cycle; i.e. there are projects that are delayed if access to capital is unrestricted but not with a restriction.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that the close relationship between the investor and the entrepreneur, although often necessary to make a new venture a success, may have a downside because the investor has information that ex post induces him to continue projects that from an ex ante perspective he would like to terminate. The venture capital cycle, enforced by restricted access to capital, creates an artificial arm's-length relationship by delegating the continuation decision to a new venture capitalist, who has less information about past effort choices and therefore has no incentive to continue projects. Projects that have a high probability of failure and offer a high private benefit to the entrepreneur will profit most from the hard budget constraint that the venture capital cycle provides. And, indeed, the innovative projects normally financed by venture capitalists are characterized by these two G. Gebhardt r 2008 The Author 84 features. The efficiency advantage of the venture capital cycle in comparison with unrestricted access to capital within a firm seems to have been a relevant factor in explaining the different outcomes during the development of handheld organizers documented in a case study by Clayton et al. (1999) .
In the early 1990s, Palm Computing and Apple developed palm-sized computers roughly at the same time. Both were initially unsuccessful with customers. While venture-capital-financed Palm Computing was forced to dramatically change the design of its organizer in a way that made it simpler and cheaper, Apple only reacted with small modifications. In the end, Palm Computing took the market having spent only $8 million on the development while Apple ended its efforts unsuccessfully after devoting more than $500 million to it. Clayton et al. (1999) attribute this failure to the curse of too much capital; i.e. the researchers at Apple did not focus their research efforts because they anticipated that, as long as there were still untried modifications to the product, new financing would come along. This was not the case at Palm Computing that continuously needed to convince new venture capital investors that their project was worth the investment. These new investors would have attributed continued failure in the market to a flawed basic concept. As a consequence, the researchers at Palm had to implement the ultimately successful modifications immediately.
APPENDIX A
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the subgame in which the game is in the last period, and the belief is lk. Suppose at time 4 in this period investment has been provided, and some contract with a share E N ! 0 for the entrepreneur is in place. Then it is optimal for the entrepreneur to exert effort because it is costless and she gets a non-negative monetary payoff in case of success.
At time 2, the investor will accept any contract which makes him break even given his belief and given that he expects effort to be supplied; i.e. he will accept any contract as long as
At time 1, the entrepreneur will offer the lowest possible share I N ¼Î. Working backwards to period N À 1 and belief lk À1 , the entrepreneur has an incentive to provide effort if investment has been provided and a contract with a share If the investor enters the last period with a belief l <l, there is no contract that allows the entrepreneur to break even, and no investment will take place. Now consider the subgame in which the game is in period N À 1, and both players hold the belief lk; i.e. there has been no delay, so far. Suppose at time 1 a contract withÎ NÀ1 ¼ K=glk has been proposed and accepted, and the entrepreneur has to decide whether to exert effort or not. If she exerts effort, the project will not be financed in period N, and the period N payoff will be zero. Therefore, the expected payoff from supplying effort is
If she does not exert effort, by the above argument the project will receive financing in period N, and the expected period N payoff will be b þ gl½R þ db=ð1 À dÞ À K. Thus, the expected payoff of no effort in period N À 1 is
Condition (4) for the case of k ¼k follows from comparing these two expected payoffs and solving for b. If condition (4) holds, it is better for the entrepreneur to shirk. This holds a fortiori for any contract with I NÀ1 >Î NÀ1 , and there is no I NÀ1 <Î NÀ1 for which the investor can break even. Consider an earlier period N À l with l41 if delay has not yet occurred so that the players hold the belief l NÀl ¼ lk Àlþ1 . Suppose at time 1 a contract withÎ NÀl ¼ K=glk Àlþ1 has been proposed and accepted, and the entrepreneur has to decide whether to exert effort or not. If the entrepreneur shirks, the project will be continued without delay from next period on and the payoff is
If the entrepreneur exerts effort, the highest possible payoff is achieved if the project continues without delay until period N À 1, and the entrepreneur gets all the surplus; in this case, her payoff is
it cannot be optimal for the entrepreneur to exert effort in period N À 1. This holds a fortiori for any I >Î NÀl , and there is no I <Î NÀl for which the investor can break even. Plugging in for Mk Àlþ1 and Bk Àlþ1 , we get b > ð1 À dÞ 1 À ½dð1 À gÞ l 1 À dð1 À gÞ lk Àlþ1 ðgR À KÞ À 1 À d l 1 À d ð1 À lk Àlþ1 ÞK ( ) ½1 À lk Àlþ1 þ lk Àlþ1 ð1 À gÞ l d l ðA:1Þ
which is equivalent to condition (4) for the case k ¼k À l. &
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The if part follows immediately from Lemma 1: if there has not already been a delay before period N À 1, by Lemma 1 there will be a delay in period N À 1 if (7) holds. We prove the only if part by induction. We have already shown in the proof of Lemma 1 that there will be no delay in period N À 1 if there has been no delay yet and if (7) is violated. In addition, we show by induction that there is no delay in period N À l, l41, if (1) equation (7) is violated and (2) there is no delay from period N À l þ 1 on.
Consider any period N À l with l41 where there has not been a delay yet: if there is no delay in the periods after the project has been pursued in period N À l, the payoff from exerting effort after investment and with a contract I NÀl ¼ K=glk Àlþ1 is given by
By the proof of Lemma 1, the project will not be delayed twice so that the payoff from shirking is
Therefore if brð1 À dÞðMk Àlþ1 þ Bk Àlþ1 Þ the entrepreneur will exert effort. Note that this condition holds for any l41 if it holds for l 5 1, which it does if (7) is violated.
We know that there is no delay in period N À 1 if (7) is violated. And from the argument above, we know that if there is no delay in N À 1, there is no delay in N À 2 and so on. This proves the if part of the proposition. &
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let l V t be the belief of a newly entering venture capitalist in period t. In period N, the entrepreneur will always exert effort because in case of success she gets G. Gebhardt r 2008 The Author 88 db=ð1 À dÞ and E N , the latter being weakly positive due to the wealth constraint of the entrepreneur. Anticipating this, the venture capitalist will accept any contract with I N ZÎ N ¼ K=gl V N . As long as l V N Zl, this implies E N ! 0, and the entrepreneur will propose a contract withÎ N ; otherwise there is no investment.
Let l E t be the belief of the entrepreneur in period t. In period N À 1, the entrepreneur will always exert effort as long as E NÀ1 ! 0 because in period N the refinancing decision and, therefore, the expected payoff do not depend on the effort choice in period N À 1. If she anticipates that there will not be investment in period N, by exerting effort she gets an expected payoff of b þ gl E NÀ1 ½E NÀ1 þ db=ð1 À dÞ, which is larger than b, the payoff from shirking. If she anticipates investment in period N, it is still better to exert effort: exerting effort yields a payoff of
A similar argument holds for all periods. Hence, in all periods it is a dominant strategy for the entrepreneur to exert effort if there has been investment. Therefore, the venture capitalist will invest in every period t in which l V t Zl, and the entrepreneur exerts effort and gets the whole surplus. The only sequence of beliefs for the venture capitalist that is consistent with these strategies is fl k gk 0 . With these beliefs, there will be investment and effort in the firstk ¼ N À 1 periods and no investment thereafter.
&
